Ronald M. Harstad

Curriculum Vitae

January 2017

Coordinates:,, Voicemail:  1.573.882.3299

Postal: Economics Dept., Professional Bldg., Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA


University of Pennsylvania: Ph.D. in Economics, 1977

Michigan State University: B.S. (mcl) in Economics and the Honors College, 1973

University of Missouri:

J Rhoads Foster Professor of the Economics of Regulated Industries,

Economics Department, College of Arts and Science, 2004-

University of Bonn:

Senior Visiting Scholar, Institute "Rationality in Light of Experimental Economics", 2012-


Research Fields (Journal of Economic Literature classifications):

Game Theory, Auctions, Laboratory Economics, Behavioral Economics, Value Elicitations (C7, C9, D4, D8, H4, L1)

Teaching Specialties:

Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Laboratory Economics, Industrial Organization, Financial Markets, Operations Research

Selected Consulting:

Bidding consultant for radio spectrum auctions, SBC Communications, (FCC PCS MTA, 1994-95) and SBC/BellSouth/Cingular (700 MHz, 2000)

Occasional consultant on auction design, market-making, competition in electronic marketplaces, eliciting values for projects or new products, damage assessments, agenda control on e-commerce websites

Selected Impact:

US Federal Communications Commission cites only two research articles on auctions as being specific enough to directly provide assistance in designing airwaves auctions (PP Docket 93-293); I co-authored both articles (working papers with M. H. Rothkopf later published in OR and EJOR, listed below).

Research Grants:

2016  BEAM ORA programme grant, Agence Nationaelle de la Recherche, (with M. Willinger), funded for four years.

1997 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation grant, SBR 97-09861, “Transactions Costs in Auctions,” (with M. H. Rothkopf), funded for two years.

1993 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation grant, SBR 93-09333, “Enriched Modeling of Auctions and Bidding,” (with M. H. Rothkopf).

1991 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation grant, SES 91-08551, “Enriched Modeling of Auctions and Bidding,” (with M. H. Rothkopf), funded for two years.

1984 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation grant, IST 84-08396, “The Role of Information and Information Processing in Auctions: Theory and Experimentation,” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), funded for two years.

1979 Project Director, National Science Foundation grant, SES 79-15356, “Interactive Behavior Experimentation,” (with J. K. Murnighan, A. E. Roth, F. Schoumaker), renewed 1980, 1981, 1982.


Top journals included in publications: Econometrica, Journal of Economic Literature, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy, Rand Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Operations Research, Management Science

Refereed Articles:

"The Welfare Cost of Signaling" (with F. Yang), Games, in press (pdf).

“Diminished-Dimensional Political Economy” (with R. Selten), European Economic Review, 83 (2016), 213-219 (pdf).

Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive (with R. Selten), Journal of Economic Literature, 52:1 (2013, June), 499-511 (pdf).

“Auctioning the Right to Choose When Competition Persist,s Decision Analysis, Special Michael Rothkopf Memorial Issue 7 (2010), 78-85 (pdf).

“Information Variability Impacts in Auctions (with J. Jia and M. H. Rothkopf), Decision Analysis, Special Michael Rothkopf Memorial Issue 7 (2010), 137-142 (pdf).

“Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf (with A. Pekec) Interfaces, 38 (2008), 367-380 (pdf).

“Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder? Applied Economics Research Bulletin, (2008), 1st article published (pdf).

Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders” (with A. Pekec and I. Tsetlin), Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (2008), 476-508 (pdf).

“Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly” (with V. Mares), Economic Theory, 32 (2007), 399-410 (pdf).

“Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values” (with G. W. Harrison and E. E. Rutstrom), Experimental Economics, 7 (2004), 123-140 (pdf).

“Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions” (with V. Mares), Journal of Economic Theory, 109 (2003), 264-282 (pdf).

“Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?” (with M. H. Rothkopf and Y. Fu), Management Science, 49 (2003), 71-84 (pdf).

“Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules,” Experimental Economics, 3 (2000), 261-80 (pdf).

“An Alternating Recognition Model of English Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Management Science, 46 (2000), 1-18 (pdf).

“Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider” (with M. A. Crew), Journal of Regulatory Economics, 15 (1999), 141-63 (pdf).

“Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf and A. Pekeč), Management Science, 44 (1998), 1131-47 (pdf).

“Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bidtakers(with K. Waehrer and M. H. Rothkopf), Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (1998), 179-92 (pdf).

Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Operations Research, 43 (1995), 983-94 (pdf).

“Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common-Value Auctions” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), International Journal of Game Theory, 24 (1995), 297-319 (pdf).

“Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Journal of Business, 68 (1995), 257-67 (pdf).

“Privately Informed Seekers of an Uncertain Rent,” Public Choice, 83 (1995), 81-93 (pdf).

“Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Management Science, 40 (1994), 364-84 (pdf).

“On the Role of Discrete Bid Levels in Oral Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), European Journal of Operational Research, 74 (1994), 572-81 (pdf).

“Asymmetric Bidding in Second-Price, Common-Value Auctions,” Economics Letters, 35 (1991), 249-52 (pdf).

“Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry,” Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1990), 421-29 (pdf).

“Equilibrium Bid Functions for Auctions with an Uncertain Number of Bidders” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Economics Letters, 33 (1990), 35-40.

“Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Econometrica, 55 (1987), 1275-1304 (pdf).

“Symmetric Bidding in Second-Price, Common-Value Auctions” (with D. Levin), Economics Letters, 20 (1986), 315-19.

“A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions” (with D. Levin), Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 525-28 (pdf).

“Behavioral Explanations of Efficient Public Good Allocations” (with M. Marrese), Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1982), 367-83 (pdf).

“Implementation of Mechanisms by Processes: Public Good Allocation Experiments” (with M. Marrese), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2 (1981), 129-51.

“Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning” (with A. Postlewaite), Management Science, 27 (1981), 75-80 (pdf).

Contributions to Refereed Volumes:

“Futures Market Speculation When You Don't Know Who the Optimists Are” (with L. Phlips), pp. 63-78 in: W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu and E. van Damme (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer, Heidelberg, 1996.

“Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility When Bidders Have Private Information about Competitors” (with M. H. Rothkopf and K. Waehrer), pp. 1-13 in: M. R. Baye (ed.), Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, Auctions, JAI Press, Greenwich, Ct., 1996 (pdf).

“Lottery Qualification Auctions” (with R. F. Bordley), pp. 157-83 in: M. R. Baye (ed.), Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, Auctions, JAI Press, Greenwich, Ct., 1996 (pdf).

“Common-Value Auctions with Independent Information: A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game” (with W. Albers), pp. 308-36 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer, Berlin, 1991 (pdf).

“Interaction Between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis” (with L. Phlips), pp. 289-307 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer, Berlin, 1991 (pdf).

“Perfect Equilibria of Speculative Futures Markets” (with L. Phlips), pp. 157-74 in J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard and L. A. Wolsey (ed.), Economic Decision-Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation - Contributions in Honour of Jacques Dreze, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1990 (pdf).

Contributions to Scholarly Volumes:

“Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly,” (with S. Martin and H.-T. Normann), in L. Phlips (ed.), Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1997 (pdf).

Publications in an Editorial Capacity:

“Laboratory Investigations of Expectations in Games: The Amsterdam Papers,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25 (1996), Issue 3.

“Introduction to Methods, Morals and Markets,” pp. 3-8 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer, Berlin, 1991.

Contributions to Conference Volumes:

“Franchise Bidding with Vickrey Auctions” (with M. A. Crew), pp. 117-30 in M. A. Crew (ed.), Innovative Approaches to Utility Regulation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 (pdf).

“Dual Ceteris Paribus Comparisons: Some Initial Thoughts on Laboratory Isolation of Equilibrium Forces in Auction Markets,” pp. 173-83 in: R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten (ed.), Modeling Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, Springer, Berlin, 1988.

Auction Design Proposal Published in the Public Docket:

A Blueprint for a Multi-Round Auction with Package Bidding, in FCC DA 00-1075 (2000) (pdf).

Selected Reports:

“The Economic Impact of the University of Missouri System” (with J. Haslag) (2007) (pdf).

Submitted Manuscripts:

“Behavioral Efficiency: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration, revised and resubmitted

Work in Progress:

Diminished-Dimensional Political Economy with R. Selten.

“A Simple Laboratory Demonstration of Behavioral Efficiency Methodology

“Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions.”

“Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify Adverse Selection with R. F. Bordley .


3275 citations in Google Scholar (h-index:22)

3190 citations in Google Books

Topic citations in Google Scholar:

common-value auctions: 1/6th of top 20 and top 30

Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions, Management Science, 1998:

computationally manageable: 1st

computational manage auctions: 2nd (1st by citations, 1051)

Computational auctions: 14th (3rd by citations)

auctions: 12th

Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003:

information revelation auctions: 1st

information revelation: 15th

138,000 websites cite Ron Harstad, primarily my research or acknowledge my contributions (Google search)

(Includes cites on webpages in nations ranging from *.ae to *.za)

1800+ acknowledgments in major scholarly journals


Associate Editor, European Economic Review, 2003-07

Autonomous Area Editor, “Games and Experiments, International Journal of Game Theory, 1995-2001

International Editor, Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 1988-91

Referee or editor for over 1600 submissions to 40 scholarly journals and for 75 research proposals to national science foundations of eight nations

Prior Appointments:

1993-2004 Rutgers University

Professor of Economics and Finance, Rutgers Business School; Senior Research Fellow, RUTCOR (Rutgers Center for Operations Research)

1987-1993 Virginia Commonwealth University

Associate Professor of Economics

1983-1987 University of Houston

Assistant Professor of Economics

1981-1983 Texas A & M University

Assistant Professor of Economics

1977-1981 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Assistant Professor of Economics

Temporary Appointments:

2011, June University of Bergen

Visiting Professor, Economics Department

2011, May University of Vienna

Visiting Professor, Vienna Graduate School of Economics

2011, March University of Basel

Visiting Professor, Economics Department

2011, Jan-Feb Washington University in St. Louis

Visiting Professor, Economics Department

2010, Fall University of Arizona

Visiting Professor, Economics Department

2009- University of Arizona

Research Associate, Economic Science Laboratory and Economics Department

2003,Spring Washington University in St. Louis

Visiting Professor, Olin School of Business

2002-2003 Duke University

Visiting Research Professor, Fuqua School of Business

2001-2002 Duke University

Visiting Professor, Fuqua School of Business

1995-1996 University of Virginia

Visiting Research Professor of Economics

1995, Fall University of Bonn, Germany

Visiting Research Professor of Economics (SFB 303)

1993,Spring University of Bonn, Germany

Visiting Research Professor of Economics (SFB 303)

1992-1993 University of Mississippi

Visiting Associate Professor of Economics and Finance

1988,Spring University of Bielefeld, Germany

Guest Scientist, Center for Interdisciplinary Research

1980-1981 University of British Columbia

Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics

Selected Honors and Awards:

Scholar in Residence, Osaka University, July-October 2011

Scholar in Residence, University of Montpellier, June-September 2010

Scholar in Residence, Center for Math Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, May 2010

Keynote speaker, Inauguration of the Center for Economic Theory and Behavior, University of Magdeburg, October 2004

Keynote speaker, First Annual Bank of Austria Conference on E-Commerce, Charles University, Prague, March 2001

Rene Roy- Edmond Malinvaud Lecturer, CNRS, Ecole du Ponts e Chausees, Paris, April 1988

Official Positions in Scholarly Organizations:

MISSEL (Missouri Social Science Experimental Laboratory, Washington University in St. Louis)

Co-Organizer, Inaugural Experimental Economics Conference, October 2008

INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)

Co-Organizer, Michael Rothkopf Memoral Conference, June 2009

Program Committee Member, .1994, 1997, 1999, 2001

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303

(German National Science Foundation, Special Research Area 303):

Program Committee Member, International Workshop on Bounded Rationality, 1997.

Economic Science Association:

Member, Task Force on the Creation of a Journal of Experimental Economics, 1991-93

Econometric Society:

Program Committee Member, 1983 Winter Meetings and 1979 Summer Meetings

Public Choice Society:

Program Committee Member, 1980 and 1981 Annual Meetings

Midwest Mathematical Economics Society:

Conference Organizer, Fall 1978 Meetings

Dissertation Supervision:

Supervisor, co-supervisor or dissertation committee member in the last twenty years for 34 Ph.D. students at universities in four nations

Placed or co-placed students at Duke University, Northwestern University, Washington University in St. Louis, University of Texas, Vanderbilt University, University of Copenhagen, Humboldt University-Berlin, University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona

Selected Administrative Experience:

Economic Advisor to the President, University of Missouri System, 2007-.

Elected to Faculty Council, University of Missouri, 2006-7.

Member, Chancellor's Advisory Committee, Univeristy of Missouri, 2005-.

External reviewer for endowed chair candidate evaluation (twice), for promotion to full professor (9 times), for tenure (23 times), across four nations.

Member of search committee for endowed chair search, twice, and nominating committee for endowed chair, five times, University of Missouri.

Chair of faculty recruiting committee, 3 years, member, 21 years.

Parliamentarian, Rutgers Business School, 1999-2001.

Director, experimental lab, Missouri, 2004-07, 2014-/VCU, 1987-90; Houston, 1983-87, Illinois, 1977-81.

Member, Committee to draft By-laws for first US Institutional Review Board, University of Illinois, 1979-80.

Teaching Experience:

Both Graduate and Undergraduate: Microeconomic Theory, Mathematical Economics, Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Public Finance, Managerial Economics.

Graduate: Auction Theory, Understanding Innovation in Financial Markets, Modeling and Analyzing Auctions and Bidding, Probability and Statistics, Operations Research.

Undergraduate: Intermediate Microeconomics, Microeconomic Principles, Economics of Regulation.