Ron Harstad, Publications

Ron Harstad

Published Articles

 

Articles that I have been able to make available as .pdf files

 

 

2008:

“Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders” (with A. Pekec and I. Tsetlin), Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (2008), 476-508 (pdf).

2007:

“Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly” (with V. Mares), Economic Theory, 32 (2007), 399-410 (pdf).

2004:

“Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values” (with G. W. Harrison and E. E. Rutstrom), Experimental Economics,7 (2004), 123-140 (pdf).

2003:

“Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions” (with V. Mares), Journal of Economic Theory, 109 (2003), 264-282 (pdf).

“Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?” (with M. H. Rothkopf and Y. Fu), Management Science, 49 (2003), 71-84 (pdf).

2000:
“Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules,” Experimental Economics, 3 (2000), 261-80 (pdf).

“An Alternating Recognition Model of English Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Management Science, 46 (2000), 1-18 (pdf).

“A Blueprint for a Multi-Round Auction with Package Bidding,” in FCC DA 00-1075 (2000) (pdf).

1999:
“Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider” (with M. A. Crew), Journal of Regulatory Economics, 15 (1999), 141-63 (pdf).

1998:
“Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf and A. Pekec), Management Science, 44 (1998), 1131-47 (pdf).

“Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bidtakers” (with K. Waehrer and M. H. Rothkopf), Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (1998), 179-92 (pdf).

1997:
“Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly,”
(with S. Martin and H.-T. Normann), in L. Phlips (ed.), Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1997 (pdf).

1996:
“Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility When Bidders Have Private Information about Competitors”
(with M. H. Rothkopf and K. Waehrer), pp. 1-13 in: M. R. Baye (ed.), Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, Auctions, JAI Press, Greenwich, Ct., 1996 (pdf).

1995:
“Withdrawable Bids as Winner’s Curse Insurance”
(with M. H. Rothkopf), Operations Research, 43 (1995), 983-94 (pdf).

“Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common-Value Auctions” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), International Journal of Game Theory, 24 (1995), 297-319 (pdf).

“Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Journal of Business, 68 (1995), 257-67 (pdf).

“Privately Informed Seekers of an Uncertain Rent,” Public Choice, 83 (1995), 81-93 (pdf).

1994:
“Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay”
(with M. H. Rothkopf), Management Science, 40 (1994), 364-84 (pdf).

1992:
“Franchise Bidding with Vickrey Auctions”
(with M. A. Crew), pp. 117-30 in M. A. Crew (ed.), Innovative Approaches to Utility Regulation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 (pdf).

1991:
“Asymmetric Bidding in Second-Price, Common-Value Auctions,”
Economics Letters, 35 (1991), 249-52 (pdf).

“Common-Value Auctions with Independent Information: A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game” (with W. Albers), pp. 308-36 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer, Berlin, 1991 (pdf).

“Interaction Between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis” (with L. Phlips), pp. 289-307 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer, Berlin, 1991 (pdf).

1990:
“Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1990), 421-29 (pdf).

“Perfect Equilibria of Speculative Futures Markets” (with L. Phlips), pp. 157-74 in J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard and L. A. Wolsey (ed.), Economic Decision-Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation - Contributions in Honour of Jacques Dreze, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1990 (pdf).

1987:
“Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study”
(with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Econometrica, 55 (1987), 1275-1304 (pdf).

1985:
“A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions”
(with D. Levin), Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 525-28 (pdf).

1982:
“Behavioral Explanations of Efficient Public Good Allocations”
(with M. Marrese), Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1982), 367-83 (pdf).

1981:
“Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning”
(with A. Postlewaite), Management Science, 27 (1981), 75-80 (pdf).