Ronald M. Harstad
August 2009
Coordinates:
HarstadR@missouri.edu, http://harstad.missouri.edu,
Voice: 573.882.3299; Fax: 573.882.3406
Postal: Economics Dept., Professional Bldg.,
Education:
University of Pennsylvania: Ph.D. in Economics, 1977
Michigan State University: B.S. (mcl)
in Economics and the
J Rhoads Foster Professor of the Economics of Regulated
Industries,
Economics Department, College of Arts and Science, 2004-
Research
Fields (Journal of Economic
Literature classifications):
Game Theory, Auctions, Laboratory Economics, Value
Elicitations (C7,
C9, D4, D8, H4, L1)
Teaching
Specialties:
Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Laboratory Economics,
Industrial Organization, Financial Markets, Operations Research
Selected
Consulting:
Bidding consultant for radio spectrum auctions,
SBC Communications, (FCC
PCS MTA, 1994-95) and SBC/BellSouth/Cingular (700 MHz, 2000)
Consultant on auction design, market-making,
competition in electronic marketplaces, eliciting values for projects or new
products, damage assessments, agenda control on e-commerce websites
Selected
Impact:
US
Federal Communications Commission cites only two research articles on auctions
as being specific enough to directly provide assistance in designing airwaves
auctions (PP Docket 93-293); I co-authored both articles (working papers with M. H.
Rothkopf later published in OR and EJOR, listed below).
Research
Grants:
1997 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science
Foundation grant, SBR
97-09861, “Transactions Costs in
Auctions,” (with M.
H. Rothkopf), funded for two years.
1993 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science
Foundation grant, SBR
93-09333, “Enriched Modeling of
Auctions and Bidding,” (with
M. H. Rothkopf).
1991 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science
Foundation grant, SES
91-08551, “Enriched Modeling of
Auctions and Bidding,” (with
M. H. Rothkopf), funded for two years.
1984 Co-Principal Investigator, National Science
Foundation grant, IST
84-08396, “The Role of Information
and Information Processing in Auctions: Theory and Experimentation,” (with J. H. Kagel
and D. Levin), funded for two years.
1979 Project Director, National Science Foundation
grant, SES 79-15356,
“Interactive Behavior
Experimentation,” (with
J. K. Murnighan, A. E. Roth, F. Schoumaker),
renewed 1980, 1981, 1982.
Publications:
Top journals included in
publications: Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory,
Journal of Political Economy, Rand
Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Operations Research, Management Science
Refereed
Articles:
“Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf” (with A. Pekec) Interfaces, 38 (2008), 367-380 (pdf).
“Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?” Applied Economics Research Bulletin, (2008), 1st article published (pdf).
“Information
Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders” (with A. Pekec
and I. Tsetlin), Games and Economic Behavior,
62 (2008), 476-508 (pdf).
“Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly” (with V. Mares), Economic Theory, 32 (2007), 399-410 (pdf).
“Experimental Methods and Elicitation
of Values” (with G.
W. Harrison and E. E. Rutstrom), Experimental
Economics, 7 (2004), 123-140 (pdf).
“Private Information Revelation
in Common-Value Auctions” (with V. Mares), Journal of Economic Theory, 109 (2003), 264-282 (pdf).
“Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually
Costly?” (with M. H. Rothkopf and Y. Fu), Management
Science, 49 (2003),
71-84 (pdf).
“Dominant Strategy Adoption and
Bidders’ Experience with Pricing Rules,” Experimental Economics, 3 (2000), 261-80 (pdf).
“An Alternating Recognition
Model of English Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Management Science, 46 (2000), 1-18 (pdf).
“Franchise Bidding without
Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider” (with M. A. Crew), Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 15 (1999), 141-63 (pdf).
“Computationally Manageable
Combinational Auctions” (with
M. H. Rothkopf and A. Pekeč), Management
Science, 44 (1998), 1131-47 (pdf).
“Auction Form Preferences of
Risk-Averse Bidtakers” (with K. Waehrer and M.
H. Rothkopf), Rand Journal of Economics, 29
(1998), 179-92 (pdf).
“Withdrawable
Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Operations Research, 43 (1995), 983-94
(pdf).
“Comparative Static Effects of
Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price
Common-Value Auctions” (with
J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), International
Journal of Game Theory, 24 (1995), 297-319 (pdf).
“Two Models of Bid-Taker
Cheating in Vickrey Auctions” (with M. H. Rothkopf), Journal of Business, 68 (1995), 257-67 (pdf).
“Privately Informed Seekers of an Uncertain Rent,” Public Choice, 83 (1995), 81-93
(pdf).
“Modeling Competitive Bidding: A
Critical Essay” (with
M. H. Rothkopf),
Management Science, 40 (1994), 364-84 (pdf).
“On the Role of Discrete Bid
Levels in Oral Auctions” (with
M. H. Rothkopf),
European Journal of Operational Research, 74 (1994),
572-81 (pdf).
“Asymmetric Bidding in
Second-Price, Common-Value Auctions,”
Economics Letters, 35
(1991), 249-52 (pdf).
“Alternative Common-Value
Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry,” Journal of
Political Economy, 98 (1990), 421-29 (pdf).
“Equilibrium Bid Functions for Auctions with an
Uncertain Number of Bidders” (with J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Economics Letters, 33 (1990), 35-40.
“Information Impact and Allocation
Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study” (with J. H. Kagel
and D. Levin),
Econometrica, 55 (1987),
1275-1304 (pdf).
“Symmetric Bidding in Second-Price, Common-Value
Auctions” (with D.
Levin), Economics
Letters, 20 (1986), 315-19.
“A Class of Dominance Solvable
Common-Value Auctions” (with
D. Levin), Review
of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 525-28 (pdf).
“Behavioral Explanations of
Efficient Public Good Allocations” (with M. Marrese), Journal of
Public Economics, 9 (1982), 367-83 (pdf).
“Expected-Utility-Maximizing
Price Search with Learning” (with A. Postlewaite), Management Science, 27 (1981), 75-80 (pdf).
Contributions to Refereed Volumes:
“Futures Market Speculation When You Don't Know
Who the Optimists Are” (with
L. Phlips), pp. 63-78 in: W. Albers, W. Güth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu
and E. van Damme (eds.), Understanding
Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer, Heidelberg, 1996.
“Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility When
Bidders Have Private Information about Competitors” (with M. H. Rothkopf and K. Waehrer), pp. 1-13 in: M. R. Baye
(ed.), Advances
in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, Auctions, JAI Press, Greenwich, Ct., 1996
(pdf).
“Lottery Qualification Auctions” (with R. F. Bordley),
pp. 157-83 in: M. R. Baye (ed.), Advances in
Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, Auctions, JAI Press, Greenwich, Ct., 1996 (pdf).
“Common-Value Auctions with Independent
Information: A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game” (with W. Albers), pp. 308-36 in
Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer,
“Interaction Between
Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis” (with L. Phlips),
pp. 289-307 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer,
“Perfect Equilibria of
Speculative Futures Markets” (with L. Phlips), pp. 157-74 in J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard and L. A. Wolsey (ed.), Economic
Decision-Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation
- Contributions in Honour of Jacques Dreze, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1990
(pdf).
Contributions to Scholarly Volumes:
“Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly,” (with S. Martin and H.-T. Normann), in L. Phlips
(ed.), Applied
Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1997 (pdf).
Publications in an Editorial Capacity:
“Laboratory Investigations of Expectations in
Games: The
“Introduction to Methods, Morals and Markets,” pp. 3-8 in Volume II of: R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models, Springer,
Contributions to Conference Volumes:
“Franchise Bidding with Vickrey Auctions” (with M. A. Crew), pp. 117-30 in M. A. Crew (ed.), Innovative
Approaches to Utility Regulation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 (pdf).
“Dual Ceteris Paribus Comparisons: Some Initial
Thoughts on Laboratory Isolation of Equilibrium Forces in Auction Markets,” pp. 173-83 in: R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten
(ed.), Modeling
Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, Springer,
Auction Design Proposal Published in the Public Docket:
“A Blueprint for a Multi-Round Auction with Package Bidding,” in FCC DA 00-1075 (2000) (pdf).
Selected Reports :
“The Economic Impact of the University of Missouri System” with J. Haslag (2007) (pdf).
Submitted Manuscripts :
“Auctioning Rights to Choose When Competition Persists,” resubmitted to Decision Analysis (pdf).
“Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify
Adverse Selection”
“Information Variability Impacts in
Auctions”
Work in Progress:
“Endogenous Competition Alters the
Structure of Optimal Auctions.”
“Normative Evaluation of Experimental
Markets”
Citations (as of 10/2008)
511 citations in social science journals since 1990 (web of science, incomplete for law, math, biology)
Older SSCI lists show
169 citations 1977-1989
500+ citations in computer science literature (citeseer.ist.psu.edu, almost
no overlap)
1619 citations in Google Scholar (includes 4th most frequently cited article
in Google Scholar search for “competitive bidding” and 12th for “auctions”)
Also, 54 citations in
Google Books
16,000 websites cite my research or acknowledge my contributions
(Google search)
(Includes cites on webpages in nations ranging from *.au to *.za)
1400+ acknowledgments in major scholarly journals
Refereeing:
Associate Editor, European
Economic Review, 2003-07
Autonomous Area Editor,
“Games and Experiments”, International Journal of Game Theory, 1995-2001
International Editor,
Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 1988-91
Referee or editor for over
1500 submissions to 35 scholarly journals and for 70 research proposals to
national science foundations of six nations
Prior Appointments:
1993-2004
Rutgers University
Professor
of Economics and Finance,
1987-1993
Virginia Commonwealth University
Associate
Professor of Economics
1983-1987
University of
Assistant
Professor of Economics
1981-1983
Texas A & M University
Assistant
Professor of Economics
1977-1981
University of
Assistant
Professor of Economics
Temporary Appointments:
2003,Spring Washington University in
Visiting
Professor, Olin School of Business
2002-2003
Duke University
Visiting
Research Professor, Fuqua School of Business
2001-2002
Duke University
Visiting
Professor, Fuqua School of Business
1995-1996
University of
Visiting
Research Professor of Economics
1995,
Fall University of Bonn,
Visiting
Research Professor of Economics (SFB 303)
1993,Spring University of Bonn,
Visiting
Research Professor of Economics (SFB 303)
1992-1993
University of
Visiting
Associate Professor of Economics and Finance
1988,Spring University of Bielefeld,
Guest
Scientist, Center for Interdisciplinary Research
1980-1981
University of
Visiting
Assistant Professor of Economics
Selected Honors and Awards:
Keynote speaker, Inauguration of the Center for Economic
Theory and Behavior,
Keynote speaker, First Annual Bank of
Rene Roy – Edmond Malinvaud
Lecturer, CNRS, Ecole du Ponts
e Chausees,
Official
Positions in Scholarly Organizations:
MISSEL (Missouri Social Science Experimental Laboratory, Washington University in St. Louis)
Co-Organizer, Inaugural Experimental Economics Conference, October 2008
INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)
Co-Organizer, Michael Rothkopf Memoral Conference, June 2009
Program Committee Member,
.1994, 1997, 1999, 2001
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft,
Sonderforschungsbereich 303
(German
National Science Foundation, Special Research Area 303):
Program Committee Member, International Workshop on Bounded Rationality, 1997.
Economic Science Association:
Member, Task Force on the
Creation of a Journal of Experimental Economics, 1991-93
Econometric Society:
Program Committee Member, 1983 Winter Meetings and 1979 Summer Meetings
Public Choice Society:
Program Committee Member, 1980 and 1981 Annual Meetings
Conference Organizer, Fall 1978 Meetings
Dissertation
Supervision:
Supervisor, co-supervisor or dissertation committee member
in the last eighteen years for 32 Ph.D. students at universities in four nations
Placed or co-placed students at Duke University, Northwestern
University, Washington University in St. Louis, University of Texas, Vanderbilt
University, University of Copenhagen, Humboldt University-Berlin, University
Pompeu Fabra in
Selected Administrative Experience:
Economic advisor to the President, University of Missouri System, 2007-.
Elected to Faculty Council, University of Missouri, 2006-7.
Member, Chancellor's Advisory Committee, Univeristy of Missouri, 2005-.
External reviewer for endowed chair candidate evaluation (once), for promotion to full professor (5 times), for tenure (12 times), across three nations.
Member of search committee for endowed chair search, twice, and nominating committee for endowed chair, five times, University of Missouri.
Chair of faculty recruiting committee, 3 years, member, 21 years.
Parliamentarian, Rutgers Business School, 1999-2001.
Director, experimental lab, VCU, 1987-90; Houston, 1983-87, Illinois, 1977-81.
Member, Committee to draft By-laws for first US Institutional Review Board, University of Illinois, 1979-80.
Teaching
Experience:
Both Graduate and Undergraduate: Microeconomic Theory,
Mathematical Economics, Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Industrial
Organization, Public Finance, Managerial Economics.
Graduate: Probability and Statistics, Understanding Innovation in Financial
Markets, Operations Research, Modeling and Analyzing Auctions
and Bidding.
Undergraduate: Intermediate Microeconomics, Microeconomic Principles,
Economics of Regulation.